


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Washington, D.C. 20505



*Defence*  
*8 Oct 77*

17 September 1977

The Honorable Charles W. Duncan, Jr.  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Charles;

Subject: Interaction of Diplomatic and Military Personnel  
in Crisis Situations ☐

25X1

☐ In response to your letter of 8 August, I agree that it is highly desirable that senior personnel of the State and Defense Departments and of our diplomatic missions possess a rapid, secure communications capability for crisis usage. For this reason the satellite communications secure voice capability of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service (DTS) has been made available to the Washington and mission elements of these departments and this Agency. The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) architecture plan calls for extension of the communications capability with the missions to subordinate military field elements. The plan further calls for the provision of facsimile and data services in addition to secure voice and narrative. This expanded requirement would call for a major redesign of the DTS, technically and philosophically.

☐ I believe that the ultimate determination on the extent to which the capability to directly communicate with an overseas mission is expanded must be provided by the Department of State since the Ambassador is the senior U.S. official in time of peace. I will discuss this matter with the Secretary of State. I understand that the Department of State plans to investigate the implications and impact of the expanded communications requirements described in the WWMCCS architecture plan.

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

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Subject: Interaction of Diplomatic and Military Personnel  
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
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25X1 ☐ Existing operating limitations in the DTS render ineffective the WWMCCS architecture plans for interoperability of the DTS and WWMCCS satellite networks.

25X1 ☐ There are no plans to provide DTS communications satellite service to all posts. We do know that local governments will not grant authority for this communications service in all instances. The capability which your planners are seeking cannot be provided totally by means of the DTS satellite network.

25X1 ☐ If the Department of Defense anticipates making available the assets to undertake this effort, with the concurrence of Secretary Vance, I would recommend that our technical staffs, under the aegis of the National Communications System, undertake an examination of the means by which some reasonable capability to achieve the intent of the WWMCCS architecture plan might be implemented. Of course, there can be no negative effect upon the capability of the DTS to fulfill its primary mission of providing communications in support of U.S. diplomatic posts.

Yours,



STANSFIELD TURNER

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Executive Registry

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA: Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM:   
Acting Deputy Director for Administration  
SUBJECT: Interaction of Diplomatic and Military  
Personnel in Crisis Situations   
REFERENCE: Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum  
of 8 August 1977, Same Subject

1. ☐ Action Requested: It is requested that you sign the attached letter to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. This informs him the Agency agrees in principle with the provision of rapid, secure communications between the Department of Defense and U.S. Embassies during crises. The letter further advises that you would undertake a joint Department of State-CIA study of means to achieve a reasonable capability with regard to the requirements of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), provided the Department of Defense anticipates making available the assets for such an effort.

2. ☐ Background: The referent memorandum requests your review of the WWMCCS architecture study and proposes the National Communications System staff, subject to your agreement that the requirements are valid, be used to examine the technical issues involved. A similar request was made of the Deputy Secretary of State. The Department's response is consistent with the attached memorandum. It is estimated that joint assessment would take six to eight months.

☐ The WWMCCS architecture studies represent an IBM perception of the DoD requirement for worldwide military command and control on behalf of the National Command Authority. This includes the capability for direct inter-connection between military commanders in the field and the personnel of overseas diplomatic missions through the sat-

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SUBJECT: Interaction of Diplomatic and Military Personnel  
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ellites of the Defense Communications System and the satellite portion of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service. Both the Department of State and the Agency are concerned that direct communications might well result in significant demands on mission personnel and activities, including uncoordinated tasking.

25X1 ☐ A study of the technical aspects of the solution proposed in the WDMCCS architecture plan was undertaken last year by communications personnel of the Departments and the Agency under the aegis of the National Communications System. That study indicated that the method and degree of the proposed communications interface suffered serious technical and operational deficiencies. No statement has been made by the Department of Defense as to the source of the required funding.

25X1 ☐ At the conclusion of this study, the parties agreed that the communications elements should go no further before a policy level decision as to the validity of the requirement perceived by the Department of Defense.

25X1 ☐ Some benefit might be derived by the Department of State and the Agency from the proposed enhancement of interaction. It is felt that the impact on the overseas missions must be found acceptable before the requirement can be stated to be valid. The appropriate elements of the Agency should participate in a review with the Department of State policy level prior to further discussion of the technical aspects and the associated costs.

25X1 3. ☐ Recommendation: It is recommended that you sign the attached letter to the Deputy Secretary of Defense informing him of your position.

//S//

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Attachment:  
As stated.

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Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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